News & Insights
Shoplifting is on the rise; a recurrent headline. Recent months have seen the news and social media awash with footage of thieves carrying bags for life, relieving supermarkets of their wine and Greggs of their sandwiches. In the year ending March 2024, the Office for National Statistics recorded a 30% rise in shoplifting offences to 443,995 from the previous year. The British Retail Consortium annual crime survey put it slightly higher, recording 55,000 incidents per day with a total loss of £2.2bn from customer theft.
The debate on tackling shoplifting has brought s.22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 into sharp focus. This provides, unless the accused elects trial by jury, that shoplifting offences with an aggregate value of £200 or less shall be dealt with in the magistrates’ court. Seeking to deliver on its manifesto promise to “scrap the effective immunity for some shoplifting”, the government seeks to repeal s.22A through cl. 37 of the Crime and Policing Bill which is currently at Committee Stage.
This backdrop, and with s.22A seemingly in its death throes makes the case of Jobson v DPP [2025] EWHC 1385 (Admin) all the more interesting. The appellant argued that the six-month time-limit for bringing charges applied to low-value shoplifting. Mrs Justice Hill disagreed, holding that all offences of theft from a shop, irrespective of their value, are indictable until the accused’s first appearance before the magistrates’ court. This article explores the decision and the wider context of s.22A in the retail crime debate.
The facts can be briefly put. Ms Jobson had stolen £88 of meat from a butcher’s shop on 10 April 2023. She was charged by way of a postal requisition on 26 October 2023, which was six months, fifteen days after the alleged offence. Ms Jobson did not attend her first appearance on 15 November 2023 and a warrant was issued for her arrest. On 5 December 2023, she appeared before the magistrates’ court having been picked up on the warrant. Ms Jobson pleaded guilty and was conditionally discharged for six months.
Later in the day, Ms Jobson’s representatives realised the offence had been charged more than six months after it was committed. They applied to re-open the case pursuant to s.142 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 (the “MCA”). This was on the basis that low-value theft was time-barred by way of s.127 of the MCA. The plea ought to be re-opened and the proceedings brought to an end.
Following full argument on 23 February 2024, the application was refused by the district judge who followed Candlish v DPP [2022] EWHC 842 (Admin) (see below). On 26 April 2024, the Judge stated the following case for consideration by the Divisional Court:
“Was I correct to find that low level shop theft is not time barred under the provision of section 127 [of the MCA] in circumstances when the proceedings are brought outside of the 6 months’ time limit for summary only offences?”
Sections 127 and 22A of the MCA were summarised by Mrs Justice Hill:
The case of Candlish concerned the issue of the “aggregate” value of goods as expressed in s.22A(4)(b). Mr Candlish was accused of eight counts of shoplifting between 29 July and 26 August 2018, but not charged until 16 April 2019 in a single postal requisition. Each theft was below £200 individually, but valued at £442.57 when taken together.
The magistrates determined that they were not bound by the six-month time-limit as the aggregate value was more than £200. On a case stated, the Divisional Court agreed. For the purpose of Ms Jobson’s case, Jeremy Baker J observed at ¶27 that low-value shoplifting was not subject to s.127(1) of the MCA because:
“…the stage at which an offence of theft may become a low-level shoplifting offence, because it fulfils the criteria set out in 22A, is on the occasion that the accused appears before the magistrates’ court to answer the charge. Until then the offence of theft is, like all other offences of theft, an indictable offence, in that it is triable either way”.
Counsel for Ms Jobson argued that Candlish could be distinguished as it concerned aggregate value shoplifting cases, that the pre-Candlish authorities supported the proposition that s.127 applied, and to apply Candlish in these circumstances would deprive s.22A of any real purpose. These arguments were all rejected.
Mrs Justice Hill held that the central issue in Candlish was the status of the individual theft offences prior to the defendant’s first appearance at the magistrates’ court. It was concluded in that case that theft was an indictable offence until an accused appeared before the magistrates’ court to answer the charge. The earlier authorities cited did not address this issue directly and their observations were not of assistance. Although accepting section 22A did not achieve much in practice, it was of practical use in that: (a) the option of electing to the Crown Court remained; and (b) a magistrates’ court could not deny a defendant a summary trial which would speed up proceedings.
The Crown argued that legal uncertainty would result if Candlish was not followed, and gave the following example in support:
On Ms Jobson’s case, Theft One would become time-barred if not charged by 30 June 2023. However, it would become “un-barred” if subsequently charged alongside Theft Two at any time. Mrs Justice Hill held that this would give rise to the possibility of offences drifting in and out of being capable of prosecution. This was “inconsistent with the need for certainty in the criminal law which the common law demands” and provided further reason to adopt the reasoning in Candlish. Moreover, the revival of criminal responsibility after the expiry of a limitation period would be incompatible with the principles of legality and foreseeably enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
With the benefit of the clear reasoning in Candlish, the decision may come as no surprise.
Although only addressed obliquely in the decision, it also appears to be in keeping with Parliament’s intention, which is set out in the explanatory notes to the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. At that time, 90% of the 80,000 cases before the court for theft from a shop were below £200 with a median value of £40. Most resulted in guilty pleas and were dealt with in the magistrates’ court. Given the volume, nature, and likely outcome of the charge, the government felt it suitable and efficient for a police-led prosecution model, which was geared towards summary-only offences. Such an approach would free up resources from the CPS to focus on more complex cases.
Accordingly, s.22A was intended to deal with the allocation and efficiency of resources. It was never Parliament’s stated intention to bring low-value shoplifting into the arms of s.127 and its purpose: to charge, try, and dispose of offences as soon as possible after their alleged commission: see Scunthorpe Justices [1998] EWHC 228 (Admin); see also Ex p. John Bryce (Contractors) Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 517, noting the additional purpose of ensuring that witness recollection is reasonably clear.
To the defence practitioner who regularly represents shoplifters in the throes of destructive addiction, poverty, poor mental health and/or crisis, this decision is no doubt a disappointment. While there is legal certainty that no time-limit exists, delayed prosecutions may hamper recovery, interrupt rehabilitation, and undermine progress.
This point was explored by Jeremy Baker J in Candlish. He observed that his reading of s.22A did not deprive an accused of protection from unwarranted delays. Where there was an “egregious delay” in charging, especially where there had been unfair manipulation of the process, this may form a basis of stay for abuse of process. Such an instance will be vanishingly rare, given the need to show “serious prejudice to the extent that no fair trial could be held”: AG Ref. (No. 1 of 1990) [1992] QB 630. This reassurance is therefore likely to be of little comfort.
In the explanatory notes to the Crime and Policing Bill, clause 37 is said to address the retail industry’s perception that the practical effect of s.22A was to downgrade the police response to low-value shoplifting. This followed the research report by Dr Taylor, and commissioned by the Co-op, who concluded in her recommendations that–
“[t]hieves claim that they can steal with relative impunity so long as they stay below the £200 threshold. Although police forces state that they do not operate with a minimum threshold, [s.22A] clearly sent the wrong message and is often cited by prolific offenders”.
The latter was supported by a Freedom of Information response which said the police failed to respond to 71% of serious retail crimes reported.
Jobson seems to underline the fact that s.22A makes little difference in practice, and its repeal will be to similar effect. As Dr Taylor observes, the average custodial sentence for shop theft is two months, which in practice eviscerates an offender’s pro-social factors and is insufficient for them to begin effective rehabilitation work. This is reflected in the 57% re-offending rate for those who receive a sentence of six months or less. This poor state of affairs is likely to remain the same with or without s.22A, though the government may yet follow David Gauke’s recommendations to reduce the use of short sentences in favour of community-based interventions.
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