The Crown Court Compendium

Bianca Brasoveanu highlights some of the important legal updates within the latest issue of the Crown Court Compendium.

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The Crown Court Compendium is the primary point of reference on criminal procedure for the judiciary when drafting directions in relation to points of law and practice – as noted by Lord Justice Simon in AG [2018] EWCA Crim 1393  – as well as being a useful vade mecum for practitioners in the course of a criminal trial.  Part I deals with Jury and Trial Management and Summing Up and Part II with Sentencing in the Crown Court. 

The compendium is published by the Judicial College, and regularly updated by its editors to reflect changes and amendments in legislation and procedure. The October 2025 update brought changes in the following areas: recent case law, guidance on procedure when the defendant’s fitness to plead fluctuates during the course of the litigation of a case and at trial, clarification on the Mountford problem, and recommendations pertaining to e-mail exchanges between Judges and advocates.

Recent Case Law

A number of recent cases are included in the Compendium addressing scenarios frequently encountered in crown court trials.

(i) R v Plummer [2025] EWCA Crim 1036

Chapters 14 and 16

This case deals with the admissibility of multiple hearsay in the context of a cell confession which was deemed to be hearsay due to the death of the person alleged to have heard the confession.

Plummer reinforces that in the rare cases in which multiple hearsay is admitted, it will be incumbent on the judge to give a very clear jury warning about the enhanced dangers, namely the greater risk of unreliability, of the evidence in question. The jury will need to be directed about each link in the chain of hearsay.

The Compendium provides the following stepped approach to assist with the determination of admissibility of multiple hearsay, which is not admissible unless one of the statements involved in the chain is:

(1) admissible as a business document (s.117); or
(2) a previous statement by a witness in the case; or
(3) all parties to the proceedings agree; or
(4) where the court is so convinced by the value of the evidence that it can invoke the additional “safety valve” in s.121(1)(c) in which case the court should identify a relevant statutory exception which would apply to admit the first chain of hearsay (eg s.116 or 114(1)(d)) before considering whether the further chain(s) are admissible as per Walker [2007] EWCA Crim 1698.

In Plummer the following extract from Maher v DPP [2006] EWHC 1271 (Admin) [26] was emphasised:

“it is important to underline that care must be taken to analyse the precise provisions of the legislation and ensure that any route of admissibility is correctly identified. In any case of multiple hearsay, that should be done in stages so that each link in the multiple chain can be tested”.

(ii) R v Green [2025] EWCA Crim 923

Chapter 3

The Judge’s conduct throughout the trial was deemed fair by the Court of Appeal, but it was held that the judge should have given a direction that the jury should ignore his comments if it did not agree with them.

(iii) R v Vaughans [2025] EWCA Crim 9

The Judge refused to allow the defendant to call an expert witness in relation to the interpretation of street slang to give a translation of the hearsay statements in the prison calls which differed from that relied upon by the prosecution expert. Arguably a decision significantly tipped against the defence.  This may be of particular relevance at a time when drill music features prominently in many murder cases or where defendants are said to be part of Organised Crime Groups (‘OCGs’).

Guidance on cases where the defendant’s fitness fluctuates during the proceedings

When the question of fitness to participate arises during a trial, the decision as to the defendant’s fitness remains with the Judge alone in accordance with s.4(5) Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964. R v Vinnell [2024] EWCA Crim 1294 provides further guidance as to the factors a judge should consider in determining fitness. In Vinnell, it was found that the Judge had erred in finding that the 86-year-old defendant in question was fit to plead and stand trial for historical indecent assault offences in the face of expert evidence suggesting vascular dementia and associated Alzheimer’s disease.

The offences alleged in Vinnell dated back to the 1970s. Two defence reports from a consultant psychiatrist and a consultant psychologist opined that the defendant was not fit to plead. The Prosecution’s expert initially found the defendant fit but having assessed the defendant a second time, the addendum report described a significant cognitive decline following which their opinion changed, concluding the defendant was unfit because although he could still understand the charges against him, he was no longer able to give evidence in his own trial. The Judge found that arrangements could be put in place for those aspects of the case to be tailored to accommodate the defendant’s needs such as shortened court days and frequent breaks in the proceedings.

The defendant’s conviction was quashed, the Court of Appeal making clear that in order for a finding of fitness to be made by the judge, all of the constituent parts of the test for fitness to plead had to be met, namely:

(i) understanding the charges;
(ii) deciding whether to plead guilty or not;
(iii) exercising the right to challenge jurors;
(iv) instructing solicitors and counsel;
(v) following the course of proceedings; and
(vi) giving evidence in their own defence. 

Plainly, the Judge’s role in determining a defendant’s fitness is a crucial one and requires careful consideration of the expert evidence presented by both sides even though the Judge is not bound to accept it. The determination however must be balanced and made within the context of the evidence and the issues that are likely to arise at trial.

Clarification on the Mountford problem

This issue is discussed in Chapter 17 of the Compendium, and it deals with the difficulties that may arise when it is argued on behalf of a defendant that the jury cannot determine the reason for their failure to mention their defence without first deciding whether the defence is true. In R v Mountford [1999] Crim LR 575  the defendant was charged with drug dealing offences and his defence at trial was that it was in fact ‘W’ – the main prosecution witness – who dealt drugs. The defendant asserted that he did not raise this defence in interview out of fear of exposing W to prosecution.  The Judge directed the jury that they could make an inference in accordance with section 34.

On appeal, Mountford’s conviction was quashed and it was found that in these circumstances the jury should have considered first whether the defence advanced at trial was untrue and only then if they found so, reject the defendant’s reason for not mentioning this fact in interview.

The compendium goes on to suggest that if faced with the Mountford dilemma, the Judge should leave the s.34 decision to the jury.

The Judge’s responsibility is to ensure the jury is properly guided through these issues and in order to do so the juries must:

(i) First decide whether the defendant could reasonably have been expected to mention the fact on which they rely at trial;
(ii) If satisfied that the defendant could have reasonably mentioned the fact in interview, then consider what -if any- inferences are available from defendant’s failure to do so.  
(iii) The jury might be sure of the first but not the second.

Etiquette on e-mail exchanges

Although e-mail exchanges between advocates and judges are acceptable within the course of a busy criminal trial, in R v Peppiat [2025] EWCA Crim 110 the Court commented that the e-mails ought to be uploaded onto the Digital Case System and the content of such correspondence – whether pertaining to legal directions or any other matter – ought to be at least summarised in open Court so that the discussions are on the record should the Court of Appeal become involved as well as for reasons of transparency.