‘Rebuilding Forensic Science for Criminal Justice: An Urgent Need’

“Forensic science is not working for anybody.” James Miller reviews the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee’s report, ‘Rebuilding Forensic Science for Criminal Justice: An Urgent Need’. In the article he explores the Committee’s terminal diagnosis for the forensic science industry, the remedies advanced and the Government’s lacklustre response to the report.

---

Introduction

“Forensic science is not working for anybody. It is not working for the police. It is not working for forensic scientists. It is not working for lawyers. Ultimately, it is not working for the general public when they read about miscarriages [of justice] in the press.” (Professor Angela Gallop).

That any aspect of the criminal justice system is in disrepair is unlikely to shock practitioners. In its February 2026 report, ‘Rebuilding forensic science for criminal justice: an urgent need‘, (“the Report”) the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee (“the Committee”) surveys the malaise in a more hidden corner of the criminal justice system.

The Report makes clear that forensic science, maybe more so than any other area of the criminal justice system, has been the victim of extraordinary neglect. The report’s overall sense is the inevitability of total collapse in this area. This article will highlight the key areas of rot, what the report proposes as a remedy, and the government’s lacklustre response to the issues raised in the report. 

Background

In May 2019, the Committee published “Forensic Science and the Criminal Justice System: a Blueprint for Change“. In that report, some key areas of concern were identified:

• Major market consolidation.
• Discontinuity in the provision of forensic science services.
• Underfunding and lack of coordination of research and development in the forensic science field.

The Report serves as a follow-up to an earlier 2019 report, and yet “[m]any of the issues identified by that report are still problematic” and “some areas have got measurably worse” [6].

The subheading of the Report is “an urgent need”, and it makes quite clear from where the urgency is divined. Put simply, “failures in forensic science lead to miscarriages of justice.” [7]. The result of an analysis of 218 unsafe rulings by the Court of Appeal between January 2010 and December 2016 reveals that “misleading forensic evidence was around a third of the misleading evidence in rulings that were deemed unsafe” [8]. A crippled forensic science system will inevitably lead to unjust outcomes. To avoid widespread miscarriages of justice, an immediate fix is urgently needed.

The Report identifies the key frailties in forensic science provision. It proceeds to recommend both short and long-term remedies. However, who is responsible for making those changes is currently unclear.

THE REPORT

Lack of accountability for forensic science – Joint Ministerial Responsibility

In a telling rhetorical question, Professor McCartney asked the Committee “Whose desk is it landing on and whose responsibility is it?” [15]. Who dons two pairs of latex gloves and cleans up the forensic mess? The answer is – currently – no one.

The Report demands that the “abdication of responsibility for forensic science must end” [33]. The Report proposes that a Minister in the Home Office and a Minister in the Ministry of Justice should have forensic science explicitly within their remit, and they should work together to safeguard all aspects of the system, regardless of institutional arrangements. Professor Carole McCartney gave evidence to the Committee that, when approaching the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice, she would receive the response that there was “nobody to talk to” [14]. Explicit ministerial responsibility seeks to provide an answer to the question: ‘Who can I talk to about this?’

The National Forensic Service

Accountability at the ministerial level is not the only concern voiced in the Report. An issue is raised with the service providers’ ability to ensure capacity, quality and fairness in the administration of the system.

Following the closure of the Forensic Science Service in 2012, forensic science services are no longer governed by one body. It falls on a monopolised and shrinking external market, and the ad hoc provision by 43 individual police forces across England and Wales, to steward the system. This means standards and procedures are set by multiple participants, research is not coordinated, and the quality of service varies from force to force. 

Before the publication of the Report, but after the evidence period, the Home Office published a white paper on the reform of the police nationally. Its recommendations included the implementation of the National Police Service. The House of Lords Committee welcomed this innovation as a very real opportunity for the overhaul this area needs, specifically in relation to oversight and leadership. The White Paper envisages the National Police Service consolidating the provision of forensics in the National Forensics Service (“NFS”). The Committee recognises that this will be a return to providing forensics on a national basis and will improve oversight and leadership of the system.

The Report further recommends a ‘sterile corridor’ between the National Police Service and the National Forensic Service to ensure independence. The structural divide, the Report opines, would mean greater transparency, would limit unconscious bias in police forensic investigations, and give greater consistency in service provision.

An interim fix – National Forensic Institute

However, the National Forensic Service is by no means a silver bullet. The proposed consolidation of forces and establishment of a National Forensic Service will not come into full effect until 2034. With the Report readily using phrases such as ‘post-mortem’, another decade of decline before things get better would be intolerable.

The Report recommends the establishment of a National Institute for Forensic Science to oversee best practice, drive forward research and development, and preserve key skills. Specifically, and as an interim fix, the Institute would be responsible for:

• Assessing forensic science capacity across England and Wales, including in police forces and forensic science providers;
• Maintaining expertise in “non-commercial” or lesser-used but still important specialisms in forensic science, filling in the gaps left by for-profit companies and fragmented police provision; and
• Providing a means of training forensic scientists, whether in-house within police forces or externally, analysing training needs and ensuring provision is appropriate.

A failing market – Provision of forensic science services

The specific responsibilities of the Institute appear to address complaints made by the Committee in their 2019 Report. Seven years ago, the same Committee warned of the forensic science market becoming dysfunctional. This report concludes that the market has now reached that point.

The Committee describes the market as “a near monopoly” [55] with more than 80% of external forensic science services provided by Eurofins. A consolidated marketplace poses multiple risks: range and quality of service provision, sustainability of the market should Eurofins exit, and the toothlessness of the regulator in the face of what is effectively the sole provider of services.

The 2019 report recommended that the Forensic Science Regulator assume an expanded role, overseeing the market. This has not happened, and so the most recent report inevitably reiterates their call for better market regulation.

Nor does in-house service provision provide any comfort. As greater numbers of the 43 independent police forces turn to their own forensic scientists, approaches to forensic service provision multiply and fragment. It is on this basis that the Report raises concerns about oversight, quality, transparency and consistency across the country.

Primarily, the Report recommends that the Home Office should require forces to publish standardised data on their in-house forensic capacities and any quality incidents – a fix that can be implemented before the establishment of the National Police Service. While the National Police Chief’s Council publishes voluntary guidance to coordinate service provision, the logical conclusion of the White Paper’s proposals is that only a unified approach ensures that the quality of forensic services is not a lottery from force to force.

Inconsistent police policy has further led to the decline in specialisms such as some biological and forensic toxicology. Some specialisms are no longer considered commercially viable, and thus, external forensic science providers have not retained them. A national Forensic Institute would be obliged to protect these specialisms, despite their cost.

Finally, the Report expressed a deep concern about the lack of independence and/or unconscious bias in whether specific tests are conducted and interpreted. The Report makes a strong argument that forensic science provision should be removed from the police service to the greatest extent possible. Again, the committee praised the Scottish ‘Sterile corridor’ between the forensic science providers and the police. Before the Forensic Science Service is established, the Committee said that it is “imperative” that clear, enforceable standards and as much external scrutiny as possible is applied to in-house forensic science provision [86].

Greater fairness – Equality of arms

Independence from the police is even more necessary considering the Committee’s assessment of the defence expert ecosystem as ‘fragile’. The principal concern is the hurdles defence solicitors face in securing forensic expertise. Legal Aid rates for experts are too low and less than what the CPS pays for equivalent experts. The Committee recommends, at the very least, effecting an equality in the rates.

The Committee also criticises streamlined forensic reporting. While well-intentioned, the Committee raised concerns about the insufficient detail included at stage one and the impediment this poses to defence solicitors challenging that evidence.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In April of 2026, the government responded to the Committee. The tenor of the 9-page response was positive, with multiple assertions in agreement with the Committee’s recommendations. However, the authors of the Report, in light of the government’s positivity in 2019 and void of proactivity since, are unlikely to be heartened by the government’s position.

The government assents to the creation of a National Forensic Service and will create national governance within the National Police Service. It is a bit colder, however, on the proposal of a sterile corridor, reverting to reliance on the Forensic Science Regulator, who, in the meantime, will continue to issue and enforce compliance notices related to testing practices and the interpretation of results. This is despite the Committee’s evidence questioning the regulator’s effectiveness. With 14 staff and a budget that covers almost only the payroll, the Report raised concerns about the regulator’s ability to challenge the consolidated market operators. The government’s reliance on an ineffective Regulator is just the first sign that this government will avoid the responsibilities the Report asks it to undertake.

In respect of equality of arms, the government relies on the Ministry of Justice and the Legal Aid Agency regularly reviewing the available data on experts. It commits to conducting market engagement with defence firms and experts to “improve understanding of availability”. It suggests that higher expert rates can already be authorised and loosely suggests that a review of legal aid rates will be conducted. Finally, the government intends to investigate issues with the SFR process and will “feed back to the forensic Capability board”.

In respect of all the recommendations, the Government’s approach could be described as passive: “Reform on this scale will take time, and we will prioritise activity for maximum impact”. Urgent, short-term fixes such as the interim role of the National Forensic Institute are largely ignored, with all faith stored in the National Police Service reforms, due after 2034.

CONCLUSIONS

The government’s response seems to ignore the Committee’s insistence that measures are implemented now, to avoid total collapse. Instead, the iceberg will be avoided in the next session, in the next parliament, or after police reform. The Report, “an urgent need” sets off warning klaxons in respect of every corner of the forensic science industry. The government’s response does very little to meet those warnings.

One might think that the story of forensic science in this country fits a pattern established across all corners of public life over the past 15 years, a narrative poignantly told about the criminal justice system. Cuts to vital services, underinvestment, inevitable decline, dire warnings from industry, and, finally, solutions not acted on due to a lack of imagination and resources. “Forensic science is not working for anybody” and there is very little hope for the future.